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During the past fifteen years, western European communist parties 
have gone through a period of crisis and transformation. Given the 
important challenges these parties have been facing, they have had to 
decide about issues related to the very nature of their organisations. The 
crisis of socialist regimes in central and eastern Europe, the popular 
detachment from communist ideology, and the general weakening of their 
traditional sources of support, have placed western communist parties in a 
very uncertain position with regard to their electoral future. In this context, 
these parties had to decide how to behave in front of the crisis, how to 
reverse their bad electoral results, how to recover their leverage, and how 
to manage their ideological tradition and organisational legacy in order to 
facilitate a party revival. 
The case of the Communist Party of Spain (Partido Comunista de 
España, PCE) responds to this logic of crisis and choices made with the 
goal of reviving the party. During these past decades, important changes 
have taken place in the organisation, ideology and strategy of the PCE. 
This has included the creation of a new organisation, United Left (Izquierda 
Unida, IU), in which the PCE has maintained a leading role. In certain 
respects, both organisations, the PCE and IU, have become 
indistinguishable. The aim of this paper is to explain this process of 
adaptation, the behaviour of the PCE and IU, their organisational and 
political strategies, and to clarify which factors influenced party choices 
and decisions. The period studied begins in 1986, the year in which the 
PCE decided to create IU, and ends in 2000, after the general elections. 
The following section introduces the reader to the trajectory of the 
PCE since the mid-1970’s to the mid-1980’s to then move on to discuss 
the theoretical tools needed to analyse the parties’ behaviour in the context 
of hard choices (Müller and Strom 1999)1. Finally, we will study the PCE 
and IU’s political and organisational strategies. 
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THE PCE’S CRISIS AND THE APPEARANCE OF I U 
The PCE’s multi-dimensional crisis –electoral, organisational, 
ideological, tactical, etc.– followed closely the one suffered by western 
European communist parties –WEC– (Lazar, 1988; Bull, 1995). In this 
context, the PCE is a remarkable case in terms of the depth and rapidity of 
its crisis (Botella, 1988; Amodia, 1993). However, the Spanish case also 
has interesting peculiarities that deserve to be observed closely.
During the democratic transition, the PCE adopted a moderate 
political line. The party participated in the “Euro-Communist” project and 
redesigned significant parts of its traditional platform. The PCE tried both 
to contribute to the political stability of the new democratic regime and to 
increase its own electoral appeal (Gunther, Sani and Shabad, 1986; 
Heywood, 1987). However, the party’s electoral results in the two first 
legislative elections of 1977 and 1979 were disappointing. A year after 
these second elections the outset of a serious internal conflict caused 
important leaders to leave, as well as massive expulsions and sanctions, 
and tensions between the central party structure and the regional 
branches. The authority of the secretary general was challenged openly. It 
seems clear that in spite of the apparent calm within the party between 
1977 and 1980, the internal consensus was fragile (Gunther, 1986: 501). 
On the one hand, certain sectors did not share the moderate line promoted 
by the party secretary, Santiago Carrillo. On the other, certain groups that 
supported the ideological and political changes proposed by Carrillo were 
unhappy due to his hesitation to democratise the internal party structure 
(for instance, the PCE had rejected Leninism but not democratic 
centralism). This sector, known as “the renovators” began to express their 
criticisms openly, and beginning in 1981, intensified their attacks against 
Carrillo. During 1981 and 1982 “the renovators” suffered numerous 
expulsions and sanctions. 
The PCE was already divided when the 1982 general elections 
took place: its moderate image had been damaged, its leader had lost his 
prestige, and some of its most important activists were not in the party 
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anymore. The defeat at the elections was a disaster: 3.9% of the votes and 
only four MPs (out of 350). Carrillo resigned as secretary general but the 
internal crisis and conflict grew in the following months. First, the party split 
in 1984 and the more orthodox communist wing –known as “pro-soviet”– 
abandoned the PCE creating a new communist party. After that, it was the 
former party secretary general, Carrillo, who leading the opposition against 
his successor Gerardo Iglesias, abandoned the PCE creating also a new 
communist organisation. In the mid-1980’s, therefore, there were three 
communist parties, whilst the PCE was very weak from an organisational 
and electoral point of view, and was poorly represented at an institutional 
and parliamentary level. 
In 1985, the PCE initiated a debate on the need to form an alliance 
with other left-wing organisations. This process of deliberation led in April 
of 1986 to the launching -with several other minor groups to the left of 
PSOE- of the IU. The driving force behind the creation of IU was mainly 
the PCE, which was also the biggest organisation within it. In addition to 
the PCE, the IU included five other very small parties and other non-
affiliated people -some of them former PCE members. Thus, the IU was 
created as an electoral coalition only some weeks before the 1986 general 
elections, and shortly after the referendum on the permanence of Spain in 
NATO. 
In the context of more or less radical changes within WEC parties, 
the Spanish case stands out for two reasons. The first one is the early date 
in which the Communist Party started to change (1986), preceding the 
transformations in the Italian, Swedish, Finnish and Dutch communist 
parties2. The second one is the complexity of the changes initiated with the 
formation of the IU. With the creation of the IU, the PCE was promoting an 
important organisational and political change, but the par y itself did not 
disappear. The PCE reduced its own activity very strongly, and devoted 
itself to the development of the IU. As a consequence, the IU grew and 
developed its own structures, but the communist organisation continued 
alive. The result was a complex organisation (IU) that was not a party nor a 
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coalition, in which the PCE participated actively. 
The election of this path through which the PCE was going to build 
the IU, meant making choices among very different organisational and 
political alternatives. The choices made were especially relevant given the 
fact that what was at stake was the party’s own survival. Communist 
leaders had, at least, three options: 
i) To dissolve the Communist Party and create a new organisation; 
 ii) To maintain the Communist Party without any serious 
organisational or political changes; and 
 iii) The “intermediate” option, the one finally taken, of carrying out 
organisational and political changes without dissolving the Communist 
Party. 
However, these options offered different possibilities with regard to 
the depth of the transformations. One of the most striking features of the 
Spanish case is, precisely, the evolution of the “intermediate” option for 
change. From an organisational point of view, the initial design of the IU 
was that of a complex, developed and unitary organisation, something 
more than a simple electoral coalition. Although the PCE did not 
disappear, it sharply reduced its political activity. The PCE placed itself in 
a situation close to its disappearance in favour of the IU. However, 
subsequently, the PCE reversed this strategy and promoted the recovery 
of its role and activity. From an ideological point of view, the 1986-2000 
period is characterised, to a great extent, by the radicalisation of the IU 
and the PCE. This radicalisation, interestingly enough, took place at the 
same time that the IU achieved its best electoral results, and ended not 
only with a total conflict with the Socialist Party (PSOE) but also, and more 
paradoxically, with a severe struggle with the traditionally sister union 
Comisiones Obreras (CC.OO.). 
How and why did the evolution of the PCE and IU follow this 
particular version of the “intermediate” change option? Why, after the first 
steps that suggested a separation from the traditional communist identity, 
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did an ideological and organisational step backward take place? It is 
possible to hypothesise that the creation of the IU was a PCE initiative in 
an attempt to maximise votes by diluting the communist image, in a 
moment in which the PCE could hardly be considered as an electoral 
asset. However, there were no moves towards the full development of the 
logical consequence of that reasoning: the PCE did not finally disappear 
and the IU did not moderate its platform to compete with the socialists for 
the moderate left-wing voters. Why did the PCE not accept the logical 
consequence of the formation of the IU? Why did the PCE and the IU 
adopt a radicalised political strategy that could not easily attract former 
socialist voters? We could possibly also think that with the creation of the 
IU, the PCE only wanted to form an electoral coalition and that the 
communists did not conceive a more ambitious project of transformation. 
But the moves and tactics of the PCE at the end of the 1980’s were such 
that, as we will see, they gave credibility to the possibility of a close 
disappearance of the communist organisation. Why did these initiatives not 
culminate in the dissolution of the PCE and the transformation of the IU 
into a new party? 
There are at least two possible answers. Perhaps the leaders of the 
PCE really attempted to create a new post-c mmunist organisation but 
they found or perceived important barriers to that purpose that made their 
original aim impossible. Or, perhaps, they only wanted to obtain the 
electoral rewards that an organisation like the IU could entail without 
assuming the costs of dissolving the PCE. The IU could then be an 
“umbrella” organisation for the PCE in which communists could have the 
control in the shadow. But irrespectively of what answer is closer to reality, 
it is necessary to account for the limits, barriers or incentives that guided 
the behaviour of the PCE leaders and to explain why they supported a very 
ideologically radicalised strategy towards PSOE and their former ally 
union, CC.OO. 
This paper intends to give answers to these questions by studying 
how the leaders of the PCE and IU made the choices that determined the 
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evolution of both organisations, which dilemmas they confronted, and 
which factors limited their decisions and affected the final evolution of both 
organisations. The analysis will focus on explaining the evolution of the 
PCE and IU in three aspects of their organisational and political strategies: 
the creation of the IU and the PCE’s role within ; the strategy towards the 
PSOE; and the strategy towards CC.OO. In short, the objective is to 
explain why the behaviour of the PCE and IU was as it eventually was, and 
under what preferences, strategies and pressures it took shape. Before 
beginning the analysis of the PCE and IU’s behaviour we will briefly review 
certain theoretical hypothesis about party behaviour. 
PARTY BEHAVIOUR AND PARTY CHOICES  
Parties, as other organisations, have goals and these goals affect 
party behaviour. Goals direct and legitimate the activity and the existence 
of the organisation (Etzioni, 1960; Clark and Wilson, 1961). Therefore, 
goals are a guide for action (Mohr, 1977: 477) and limit the possible ways 
of action because they constitute principles that the organisation should 
satisfy (Simon, 1964). Nevertheless, organisations also adapt to the 
environment, and doing so they change their goals to guarantee their 
survival. This idea is important because it emphasises the possibility that 
the organisation, in certain moments, will privilege objectives directed to 
assure its own survival while leaving aside other organisational goals. This 
process of goal displacement (Merton, 1957) can also operate in parties. 
The search for organisational survival involves guaranteeing the 
mechanisms that enable its functioning, and minimising the sources of 
internal and external tension (Wilson, 1973). 
Although it is important for our understanding, the identification of 
organisational goals is not an easy task. Organisations normally have 
several goals and this consideration also applies to the case of parties3. 
Going beyond Downs (1957), who considered that the main goal of parties 
and their leaders was the maximisation of votes to be able to govern, 
recent approaches have tended to define a more complex relationship 
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between the various party goals. In a famous article, Strom (1990) 
differentiated three party goals: office-seeking, policy-seeking and vote-
seeking. Following Strom’s argument, parties share all these three goals. 
There are no pure models. However, accomplishing all the goals 
simultaneously would be impossible. The pursuit of one goal may be in 
contradiction with the accomplishment of another. Leaders face trade-offs 
among these goals. In this context, the decisions made by the leaders 
about the priorities or goals to be pursued are influenced by several 
factors. Müller and Strom (1999) especially highlight two sets of aspects 
that affect leaders’ choices. The first one is formed by the organisational 
features of the party. They rfe , specially, to constraints on the leadership, 
such as factions or rules that give members the power to limit leaders’ 
decisions. The second one is formed by institutional determinants, such as 
the electoral system and party legislation (i.e. party finncing rules), and 
properties of the party system such as its competitiveness4. Therefore, 
these two sets of variables could, ideally, help us explain party behaviour, 
clarifying the reasons behind the choice of certain goals by party leaders. 
In this paper, I will concentrate on the analysis of two of these variables. 
With regard to the external factors, I will analyse the electoral competition. 
With regard to the internal factors, I will focus on the possible constraints 
that the party organisation can impose on leaders’ moves5. But, what kind 
of effect can we expect from these different factors? 
The spatial theory is the central paradigm in the analysis of party 
competition. In Downs’ (1957) well-known version, parties will modify and 
change their messages to maximise their opportunities of electoral 
success. In the one-dimensional space presented by Downs, parties trying 
to maximise votes would move their position towards the location of the 
average voter. However, real parties have consistently shown a different 
behaviour adopting, in many cases, political positions that are more 
extreme than those of their electors. The partisan moderation we could 
expect in the real world according to Downs’ model, is certainly not a 
generally extended behaviour. 
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Downs’ arguments have been frequently criticised and 
reformulated. Some of his critics argue that parties are not so free to move 
ideologically towards the average voter’s position, or that moving towards 
that position is not so beneficial from an electoral point of v ew. According 
to the saliency theory of party competition (Robertson, 1976; Budge, 
Robertson and Hearl, 1987) parties emphasize the issues in which they 
think they have an advantage, but they are limited in their capacity to 
move: some issues are att ched to specific parties, and party platforms 
also do matter. This means that leaders do not easily change their 
programmes, although they can and do vary the emphasis they give to 
different issues. The final image, according to this model, could be one 
very different to that of the Downsian mobile parties, which compete in a 
centripetal way. The directional theory of party competition (Rabinowitz 
and Macdonald, 1989) also presents an important contrast to the traditional 
Downsian model of party competition. In this case, the average position is 
not the place that parties should occupy to maximise votes. Every position 
within the “region of acceptability” can be electorally competitive if the 
electorate is symmetrically distributed. Central positions would not be 
particularly beneficial. On the contrary, parties should make strong 
statements and they should only avoid being too extreme. Thus, party 
systems would tend to moderate pluralism (Rabinowitz, Macdonald and 
Listhaug, 1991). Finally, Przeworski and Sprague (1986) argue that parties 
may sacrifice short-term electoral maximisation in favour of a more 
ideological strategy that would build solid political identities, in an attempt 
to assure long-term electoral success. 
But, irrespectively of its possible e ctoral advantages, parties 
could also adopt a radical stance due to the pressures of affiliates on the 
leaders. The idea of party members having more radical political positions 
than leaders has one of its most classical origins in Michels (1969), and 
was later reconsidered in May’s Special Law of Curvilinear Disparity. May 
(1973) argued that sub-leaders are more radical than top-leaders because 
the former are motivated by ideological incentives while top-leaders 
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prioritise the search for votes. This argument has been strongly challenged 
in several empirical studies (see, for example, Kitschelt, 1989; Norris, 
1995)6.  
In any case, the argument of members limiting the leaders’ choices 
is very rooted in the literature on party behaviour. Some of the authors 
stress the importance of possible ideological differences that would limit 
the leaders’ room for manoeuvring (Robertson, 1976). But more generally, 
what is present in most approaches is the leaders’ need to take into 
account the preferences of the affiliates in their calculations (Barry, 1974; 
Hirschmann, 1977). Given that one of the most important motivations for 
party leaders is to continue in power (Maor, 1998), they should avoid 
alienating affiliates, since they usually play an important role in the election 
of party leaders. Whether party leaders are ideologically motivated or not, 
they need to gain a minimum appreciation from members, in whose hands 
is the power to nominate candidates or, at least, to influence the process 
(Wittman, 1983; Aldrich, 1983). 
Members can influence party decisions in two ways (Müller and 
Strom, 1999): 1) directly, through their participation in formal decision-
making party mechanisms; and 2) indirectly, through their implicit threat to 
leave if the deviation of party lines from their goals exceeds their level of 
tolerance. In any case, their preferences or the perception of their 
preferences by party leaders, and the need to avoid possible sources of 
internal dissent, transform party members in a factor which influences and 
constrains leaders’ choices and, hence, party behaviour. 
Therefore, in order to explain party behaviour it is important to 
identify the party goals considered by party leaders, but also the factors 
that affect the election of their priorities. With regard to one of these 
factors, electoral competition, it is crucial to clarify how party leaders react 
to the competition environment. It is necessary to define if they conceive it 
according to Downsian principles or if they seek votes in a different way. 
Depending on how party leaders view electoral competition, different party 
behaviours should be expected. But it is also important to specify if party 
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leaders perceive their own party organisation – ts structures and 
members– as a barrier or a constraint to their d cisions. If this is the case, 
the election among different party goals will also be determined by this 
internal factor. 
The next pages will present the behaviour of the PCE and IU in 
three domains of their organisational and political strategies: the creation
of the IU and the role of the PCE; the strategy towards the PSOE; and the 
strategy towards CC.OO. The aim is to explain these strategies and to 
specify the impact of the factors previously mentioned on the adoption of 
these strategies: party competition and internal organisational limits. 
PCE’S CREATURE: THE IU, BETWEEN PARTY AND COALITION 
The creation of the IU by the PCE in 1986 and its organisational 
evolution (with the subsequent changes in the PCE’s role) are the most 
prominent expressions of the changing path followed by Spanish 
communists in the last fifteen years. The IU began to operate in 1986 as a 
mere electoral coalition with some ad-hoc commissions as its only 
organisational structure that coordinated the immediate electoral 
campaign. In addition, there was a commitment to form a single 
parliamentary group with all MPs elected under the IU’s label. However, 
since the first weeks after the 1986 elections, the IU’s organisational 
evolution made it increasingly difficult to determine whether it was an 
electoral coalition, a federation of parties and non-affiliated people, or a 
sharply divided party. In the next paragraphs we will examine five aspects 
that can help to clarify what kind of organisation the PCE has promoted for 
the IU7. 
The Structure of Organisational and Governing Bodies 
The executive committee that was formed soon after the creation 
of the IU included representatives from the different groups. This body, the 
Political Council, organised the first IU Congress that took place in 
February 1989. At that congress, the IU decided to label itself as a politic l 
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and social movement instead of as a coalition. It was also then when it 
decided to create a structure of bodies following the traditional pyramidal 
and hierarchical model of political parties. It also decided the creation of 
local organisations in which all the members of the groups integrated in the 
IU would participate. At IU’s second congress in 1990, a financial 
regulation for the operation of the IU and a federal regulation for the
relations between IU’s centre and its regional branches were approved. In 
1992, the third IU congress approved the first statutes. At the end of that 
same year other regulations were approved: a new rule that defined the 
rights and duties of IU’s public representatives and MPs; a regulation that 
allowed to create factions within the IU; and a regulation for the operation 
of working groups in charge of writing the electoral platform. At the 
following conferences, no important changes were introduced, although the 
addition of new rules and issues made the statutes more detailed. 
The IU Membership 
The concept of the IU member was only defined at its second 
congress (1990). That definition included members of the integrated 
parties (indirect members), and the non-affiliated people that were direct 
members of the IU. However, at the third congress (1992), membership to 
the IU began to be defined by the individual and direct act of joining the IU. 
In this sense, the integrated parties formally abandoned the mediation role 
that they before had in the affiliation process. Since then, all members of 
the integrated parties would get a separate membership card from the IU 
branches to become members of the IU. 
IU membership is very low (see Table 1). Although it rose during 
the 1990’s, this increase was irregular and not very substantial. Limited 
attempts to transform the IU into an open, participatory, and democratic 
organisation produced very partial results that did not improve the IU’s 
appeal. This small membership increase has not been homogeneous in all 
regions: while in certain places the growth is constant in others there has 
been a membership decrease, and even in others it is impossible to find a 
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clear trend. Andalucía, Madrid, Asturias and Comunidad Valenciana, the 
IU traditional electoral strongholds are also the biggest regional branches 
in number of members. If we observe the members/voters ratio and 
members/electorate ratio, the organisational weakness of the IU becomes 
very apparent. 
 
 
Table 1 
The IU Membership, 1992-2000 
 Members Members/ Members/ 
  Voters Ratio Electors Ratio 
 1992 57,303 0.031 0.001 
 1994 52,711 0.024 0.001 
 1995 57,000 0.025 0.001 
 1996 65,999 0.025 0.002 
 1997 71,578 0.027 0.002 
 1999 69,000 0.026 0.002 
 2000 65,000 0.051 0.002 
Source: Figures provided by the IU 
 
It seems that the increase in membership is due to the arrival of 
new members which are only affiliated to the IU, given that communist 
membership –the only integrated party with a significant membership– has 
decreased constantly since the 1970’s (see Table 2). 
Table 2 
The PCE Membership, 1977-1999* 
 Members 
 1977 191,607 
 1978 156,184 
 1981 132,069 
 1983 82,877 
 1985 67,808 
 1987 62,342 
 1991 55,000 
 1992 44,775  (78.1) 
 1996 34,704  (53.3) 
 1997 35,000  (48.8) 
 1999 26,553  (38.4) 
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*The percentage of the PCE members over the total number of the IU members is 
in parentheses 
Source: Figures provided by the PCE and taken from congressional reports 
 
The Status of the Integrated Parties 
The original creation of the IU as an electoral coalition (of seven 
parties) gave an important role to parties in the first steps of its 
development8. However, the situation has much changed since then. The 
number of integrated parties has reduced dramatically. In 2000 only three 
parties were integrated into the IU at a national level but in 2001, after the 
IR and the PASOC left, only the PCE remained. In the first three IU 
congresses the parties reserved for themselves a percentage of the total 
number of delegates. Until 1992, a system of quotas tha  distributed the 
positions in the organisational bodies and electoral lists among the 
integrated groups (considering non-affiliated members as another group) 
was at work. However, the IU statutes approved in 1992 put an end to this 
system. Since then, the decisions about the IU lists and bodies would have 
to be made without reserving or respecting any fixed quota. 
In 1997 –a period of serious internal conflicts–, he IU leadership 
regulated the activities of the integrated parties, restricting the autonomous 
action of these parties within and out of the IU. However, all these 
regulations were not enough to mask the absolute predominance of the 
PCE members among the MPs, local councillors and leaders of the IU. 
The PCE is still the most important actor within the IU. Its members usually 
form the core of the activists and cadres within the IU, and the IU 
headquarters in many cities and villages are buildings owned or paid for by 
the PCE even many years after the creation of the IU. 
The Formation of Factions within the IU 
One of the most peculiar organisational characteristics of the IU is 
that it is formed by parties, independents and factions organised in 
different ways. A relevant feature of the factions in IU is that they are also 
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formed by members of the different parties and by independents. This 
means that factions cross the party lines within the IU. The regulation for 
factions appeared in 1992 and it was then when the first faction was 
created (Nueva Izquierda). That said, there are lots of conflicts bewe n 
factions and the central leadership of IU, which shows that there exists no 
peaceful recognition of the faction system as an operating method for IU.  
The Funding of the IU 
The funding of the IU was not regulated until the second 
conference in 1990. It was then decided that the administration of all public 
subsidies would be the responsibility of the IU central office. At that time a 
membership fee was also established. There was a collective fee for the 
members of the integrated parties and an individual fee for the 
independents. The third IU congress (1992) decided that every IU member 
should pay a fee irrespective of his/her membership to any of the 
integrated parties. However, in 1997 the possibility of collective fees was 
again introduced as a result of the pressures made by the PCE. The IU 
central office receives the funding (public subsidies and fees), and then 
distributes part of the funds to the integrated parties and factions.
With regard to the real finances, the IU has increased its funds in 
the last decade. The source of this funding is mainly public subsidies (see 
Table 3). Until 1994, the IU was exclusively financed through public funds. 
From 1994 onwards, the IU began to receive membership fees. Although 
the amount of these fees has increased, this increase is hardly relevant. As 
its largest income share comes from state subsidies, the finances of the IU 
very much depend on its electoral performance. The simple consequence 
is that when the IU suffers an electoral failure, as in 1999 or 2000, the 
basic operation of its organisation is in danger. 
 
Table 3 
The IU Income, 1990-1999 
 Income Variation Public Funding Membership Fees 
1990  99.3 0 
1991 +35.5 82.2 0 
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1993 -21.5 99.9 0 
1994 +15.1 96.8 3.1 
1995 +10.8 97.1 2.8 
1996 +19.9 89.3 3.8 
1997 +4.0 94.5 4.8 
1998 -7.2 94.2 5.3 
1999 -19.3 93.5 6.4 
Source: Figures extracted from the IU reports. Data for 1992 could not be 
obtained. Income data indicate annual variation. Public funding and membership 
figures are percentages over the total income 
 
It is important to highlight that most of the PCE income comes 
from the IU’s own funding. In the PCE, the income coming from 
membership fees is only a minor part of the total income, and thus the 
funding of the communist organisation depends on the public subsidies 
received by the IU (Table 4).
 
Table 4 
The PCE Income, 1988-1999 
 Income The IU Membership Other 
 Variation Income Fees Contributions 
1988  43.1 7.9 38.8 
1989 -17.3 52.0 4.1 37.4 
1990 +103.3 61.4 4.1 11.3 
1991 -26.2 81.7 2.5 4.9 
1992 +31.9 68.5 5.0 7.3 
1993 +1.7 50.8 4.6 15.8 
1994 +76.9 24.0 3.5 11.5 
1995 -48.7 41.8 12.5 15.6 
1996 +16.7 35.8 10.7 11.6 
1999 -56.8 83.0 10.9 5.2 
Source: Figures extracted from the PCE reports. Income figures indicate annual 
variation. The rest of the figures are percentages over the total income 
 
As we have seen in previous pages, the IU has created its own 
organisational structure, having local organisations, individual 
membership, and funding. However, the integrated parties have remained 
alive within the IU. While several features of the IU make it similar to a 
party, other demonstrate that some characteristics of its origin as a 
coalition still remain. The largest party, the PCE (which is now the only 
party within the IU), has conditioned the growth of the IU. In certain 
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respects, it has strongly determined some of the organisational decisions 
made in the IU. The PCE’s great influence, for instance, deterred the IU’s 
individual membership and was detrimental for the individual payment of 
fees. Despite the regulation on the role of the integrated parties, the 
majority of the IU office holders and leaders have always been the PCE 
members. Compared to the other minor parties, the PCE has a privileged 
status within the IU. Notwithstanding the gradual creation of a separate 
organisational structure for the IU, the PCE remained being the majority 
group (and the most structured one) in all the governing bodies of IU. 
THE ELECTORAL EVOLUT ION OF THE IU: FROM THE HOPE OF 
“SORPASSO” TO THE STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL  
The IU has followed a trend of slow and irregular growth from 1986 
to 1996 (see Table 5). In the 1999 local, regional and European elections 
the IU suffered severe electoral defeats that were confirmed in the 2000 
general elections. In a certain sense, the electoral evolution of the IU has 
drawn a parabola: the IU has returned in 2000 to a vote share similar to 
that of the PCE before the creation of the IU (the 1982 general elections). 
In addition, the IU’s best results simply equalled those of the PCE’s during 
the democratic transition. This means that the IU’s electoral “ceiling” has 
been about a 10% of the vote. 
 
Table 5 
Electoral Results: The PCE and the IU 
 Percentage (over valid votes) Votes 
 PCE 1977 General 9.3 1,718,026 
 PCE 1979 General 10.7 1,940,236 
 PCE 1979 Local 12.7 2,139,603 
 PCE 1982 General 4.1 965,670 
 PCE 1983 Local 8.0 1,500,017 
 IU 1986 General 4.6 935,504 
 IU 1987 Local 6.1 1,212,262 
 IU 1987 European 5.3 1,011,830 
 IU 1989 European 6.0 981,742 
 IU 1989 General 9.1 1,851,080 
 IU 1991 Local 8.3 1,579,097 
 IU 1993 General 9.2 2,202,282 
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 IU 1994 European 13.4 2,486,550 
 IU 1995 Local 11.6 2,590,301 
 IU 1996 General 10.5 2,639,774 
 IU 1999 European 5.7 1,213,254 
 IU 1999 Local 6.5 1,383,151 
 IU 2000 General 5.4 1,263,043 
Source: Ministry of the Interior 
 
In addition, one of the most important features of the IU’s electoral 
evolution is the uneven distribution of its electoral strength across the 
different electoral districts (provinces). This was a feature that also 
characterised the electoral sociology of the PCE. However, the IU has 
obtained good results in regions where the PCE never did (for example in 
some electoral districts of Castilla y León, in the Basque Country, or in 
Navarra). Nevertheless, it is also true that the IU has never reached the 
high levels of support that the PCE obtained in certain provinces. 
Therefore, although there is a high coincidence between the IU and former 
communist strongholds, there are significant variations in the territorial 
distribution of the support for both organisations9. 
The PSOE has been IU’s main electoral competitor at a national 
level. In the 1986-1996 period, the electoral evolution of both the PSOE 
and the IU ran close together. In those districts where the IU got good 
results, the competition between socialists and post-communists was fierce 
(a strong negative correlation of their electoral results). This implies that 
there has been an intense electoral competition between both 
organisations in an important number of provinces (see Ramiro, 2000a). 
The mutual transfer of the IU and the PSOE voters in successive 
elections is a reflection of this competition. On the one hand, in relative 
terms and considering only general elections, the transfer of votes between 
the IU and the PSOE was only beneficial for the IU in 1989 –when the IU 
obtained its greatest electoral boost. Only in those elections was the 
percentage of former socialist voters that shifted to the IU greater than the 
percentage of the IU voters that shifted to the PSOE10. n the other hand, 
the relevance of this bi-directional vote transfer is very different for the IU 
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and for the socialists. Attracting voters from the IU has never been a 
priority for PSOE from a quantitative point of view, but has been crucial for 
the fate of IU. Until 1996, the IU very much depended on attracting former 
socialist voters. In 1986, 1989 and 1993, an important proportion of the IU 
electorate was formed by former socialist voters. This situation changed 
from 1996 onwards when the importance of the former PSOE voters in the 
IU electorate diminished significantly. 
The electoral competition between the IU and the socialists is 
closely related to the ideological changes of both organisations. According 
to survey evidence, the IU has slightly moderated its position in the left-
right dimension11. However, its voters consistently place themselves in 
more moderate positions. Due to a process of parallel moderation of the IU 
and its voters, the ideological distance between them has remained 
constant12. On the contrary, socialist voters have placed themselves to the 
left of that party. It is also important to note that the voters that the IU lost 
in favour of the PSOE and the voters that the PSOE lost in favour of the 
IU were in slightly more moderate ideological positions than the IU was. 
Moreover, the ideological superposition (Sani and Sartori, 1983) of of both 
parties’ voters was significant (see Ramiro, 2000a). 
In this sense, it is reasonable to argue that there was an electoral 
incentive for the IU to move towards more moderate ideological p sitions 
to better compete with the PSOE. From a spatial point of view, and 
according to traditional Downsian arguments, we could consider the 
hypothesis that the IU could have won votes or could have reduced the 
losses in favour of PSOE by modifying its ideological position towards a 
more moderate ideological spectrum, which was the one occupied by the 
socialist electorate. However, as we will see in the next pages, the PCE 
and IU leaderships did not move in that direction in a perceptible way. 
PCE’S ORGANISATIONAL STRATEG Y FOR THE CREATION OF THE 
IU 
In relation to the communist strategies around the organisation of 
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the IU, it is possible to define three periods. During these three phases the 
goals and strategies of the PCE varied. That is, the PCE had in mind 
different organisation models that had to be implemented for the IU. How 
the IU was to be organised was of crucial importance for the PCE, since 
the activity and role of the PCE itself would depend on the organisational 
model of the IU. The possible range of options was broad, from a coalition 
in which the PCE would have the leading role, to a new party and the 
subsequent dissolution of the PCE. In this sense, we will present this 
evolution as a succession of goal changes and displacements in the 
organisational strategies adopted by the communist leadership. 
The Origins of the IU. The Goals of the PCE (1985-1986) 
The PCE did not have a defined plan about the creation of the IU 
nor about the type of organisation it wanted to build. The PCE’s strategy 
was modified several times during the months previous to the creation of 
the electoral coalition. The origin of the IU is the política de convergencia 
(convergence politics) that the PCE established in 1984 and 198513. This 
strategy aimed at building stable re ationships between the PCE and other 
left-wing forces with the goal of creating some sort of coalition. This was its 
first goal. This proposal of convergence found internal resistance within the 
PCE. Certain sectors feared that this move would endanger the communist 
identity and ideology. The PCE leadership tried to eliminate these 
resistances arguing that the party would maintain its own ideology, identity, 
symbols, name, and would not dissolve itself. Party leaders defended that, 
in fact, the convergence was what could add force to the PCE. This was 
also the other goal of the política de convergencia: to recover, to renew, 
and to reinforce the PCE14. 
There were three factors that influenced the strategy that resulted 
in the launching of the IU. The first was the communist leaders’ perception 
that the moderate policies of the socialist government meant abandoning a 
left-wing electoral space that could be occupied by other forces15. 
Secondly, after the defeat in the 1982 elections, the PCE was in a very 
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fragile electoral and organisational situation. The communist leaders 
themselves thought that the party’s survival could be in danger if there was 
a new electoral defeat. The communist leadership also thought that the 
party, on its own, was not the most appropriate electoral vehicle to take 
advantage of the electoral opportunities that the socialist policies opened. 
It was necessary to create a new organisation and the perceived 
availability of voters allowed for the creation of a new left-wing party. 
Therefore, there was an electoral incentive for the creation of the IU that 
was clearly felt by the leaders of the PCE. Thirdly, there was a great 
internal resistance to any initiative that could imply the dissolution of the 
PCE16. This internal suspicion was also clearly felt by the communist 
leadership. As a consequence, the leaders had to justify the creation of the 
IU as an initiative that would buttress the PCE. This combination of the 
leaders’ perceptions shaped the initial model of the IU.  
Goal Change. The Communist Strategy in the Development of the IU 
(1986-1992) 
After the 1986 elections, and during a certain period, the PCE 
gave priority to the political and organisational development of the IU. This 
strategy implied the delegation of functions that had previously been 
assigned to the PCE, to the IU. The main reason for this initiative was the 
good electoral possibilities that the communist leaders thought the IU had. 
The development of the IU in different fields was, then, the way to follow if 
it was to grow from an electoral point of view. According to the analysis 
made by the PCE and IU leaders, the poor electoral results obtained by the 
IU in 1986 were mainly due to its lack of development. The strengthening 
of the IU was the first and main goal of the PCE in this period and 
therefore subordinated all its activity to this purpose. Once the PCE 
finished transferring its functions to the IU, communist affiliates began 
again to doubt and fear about the real future of the party. The interesting 
point was that the members’ fears were based not only in the new 
organisational priorities of the party but also in the discourse of communist 
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leaders. 
Certainly, during the end of the 1980’s, communist leaders tried to 
reduce the fears of members by assuring that the party, in spite of IU’s 
development, was going to continue existing. However, at the same time, 
the leadership, including its General Secretary, declared that there was the 
possibility that the consolidation of the IU could lead to a close 
disappearance of the party17. This contradiction finally exploded in 1991 
when part of the communist leadership positioned itself in favour of the 
dissolution of the PCE and transformation of the IU into a new political 
party18. The majority of the communist leadership opposed strongly to that 
proposal. The real disagreement was, however, around how fast the 
change should go because most of the prominent leaders had argued in 
previous years that the PCE could disappear. This latter group headed by 
the General Secretary (Julio Anguita) won the PCE’s 13th Congress by 
defending the continuity of the party in spite of their previous statements 
about its near disappearance. This change in their point of view was due to 
their belief that an important part of communist affiliates would not accept 
the party’s dissolution, and would provoke a serious conflict and, even, a 
split (see Ramiro, 2000a). For this part of the leadership, the creation of 
the IU and its electoral progress meant that the electoral pressure to get rid 
of the Communist Party had disappeared. The final result was the 
affirmation that the PCE should continue existing and that it should have a 
central role within the IU. However, this was always accompanied by the 
reiteration of the communist statement of support for the development of 
the IU19. 
Goal Displacement. The PCE’s Strategy Between 1992-2000 
After the PCE’s 13th Congress in 1991 and the IU’s 3rd Conference, 
the IU seemed to consolidate its organisational format with a model that, 
given the development of its structures, it was not exactly a coalition but 
neither was it a party20. The development and consolidation of the IU as a 
political actor caused continuous problems in defining a role for the PCE. 
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What functions could the PCE have in a context in which all relevant 
political activity was channelled through the structures of the IU? 
In the 1992-2000 period, the PCE was in a constant search for 
functions and activities for its own organisation. However, the tasks 
defined by the party congresses (for instance, to devote the PCE mainly to 
the political education of their members) found in practice, very serious 
difficulties. The PCE tried with no success to adapt its operation to the 
framework of a developed IU. In this context, since 1994, there has been a 
new goal change in the priorities defined by the PCE leadership. Although 
communist leaders repeated the traditional calls for the strengthening of 
the IU, from 1994 until 2000 the priority of its members, according to the 
discourse of the party leadership, was to strengthen and reactivate the 
PCE21. 
In this sense, communist affiliates had to direct their efforts 
towards the achievement of tasks mainly aimed to guarantee the survival 
of the PCE as a political organisation. The survival of the organisation and 
the activities associated to this goal became the priority of the party. 
During those years, therefore, a goal displacement phenomenon took 
place in the PCE. In order to maintain the party, internal discipline had to 
be reinforced. Members had to devote part of their time and their political 
activities in tasks related to the party operation (not only working in the 
development and operation of the IU); the collective payment of 
membership fees to the IU had to be established; and the public presence 
of the PCE had to be strengthened. The final goal of these initiatives was 
to keep PCE’s hegemony within the IU22. 
This new orientation was partially a result of the persistent lack of 
trust among communist members towards the IU. They feared the party 
would disappear if it lost its primary functions. In part, it was also a 
reflection of the ideological and organisational loyalty of communist 
affiliates to their party. But what really changed the party goals was the 
need to avoid the constant weakening of the PCE that, if it were persistent, 
would make the communist leaders’ control impossible. 
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The crisis of this strategy began in December 2000. The goal 
displacement, the reinforcement of the PCE as the first organisational 
priority, made sense only if the dominant coalition of the PCE and the IU 
(formed by the same persons and groups) remained united. Only in this 
situation could that strategy be implemented because all the relevant 
groups of the leadership perceived some benefits in maintaining the 
organisational tool (the PCE) that made the control over the IU easier. But 
at the end of 2000, when the IU had to elect its new leader (to substitute 
Anguita), the PCE, the IU, and their leaderships, were divided between two 
candidates. Both were members of the PCE, both were communist 
leaders, and both were members of the restricted circles of the PCE and 
the IU leadership groups: the leader of the IU and the PCE in a traditional 
stronghold of the IU (Gaspar Llamazares, leader of the regional federation 
of Asturias) and the communist Secretary General (Francisco Frutos). This 
division weakened the PCE, broke the dominant coalition, and made the 
theorised reinforcement of the party impossible. The election of 
Llamazares and the defeat of the communist Secretary General placed the 
PCE in a new crisis. Once more, the questions about the sense and future 
of a weakened PCE, which was not even able to maintain a united 
leadership within the IU, arose intensely. 
THE POLITICAL STRATE GIES OF THE PCE AND THE IU 
The Strategy Towards the PSOE 
Since 1986, the evolution of the IU and the PCE has been linked to 
PSOE, among other reasons because of their constant opposition to this 
party. One of the issues that led the PCE to create the IU was its concern 
about the tendency of the PSOE towards the centre. In fact, this was the 
PCE and the IU’s core argument in their analysis regarding the PSOE 
during all the period studied: the PSOE, due to its governmental policies, 
was not a left-wing party anymore. In 1993 and 1994, when the weakness 
of the socialists made a victory of the centre-right PP possible, the PCE 
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and the IU argued that what facilitated the conservatives’ electoral growth 
were the PSOE’s moderate policies23. After the PP victory in 1996, the IU 
and the PCE continued identifying the PSOE with the right, and continued 
arguing that there were no differences between the PSOE and the PP. This 
argument was again used in the 1999 elections, although in a more 
moderate way. 
 This definition of the PSOE had obvious consequences over the 
possibility of establishing alliances between PSOE and the IU in local, 
regional and national governments. Since 1987, the IU has shown a scarce 
interest in the formation of coalition governments with the PSOE. The IU 
and the PCE leadership have given priority to the defence of their 
ideological identity instead of favouring agreements with the PSOE. 
Instead of approaching the PSOE, their competitor and hypothetical ally in 
the formation of governments, the PCE and the IU preferred to 
differentiate themselves from the socialists. The PCE and IU leaders 
clearly understood the pacts and agreements as a loss of autonomy. This 
strategy was also expressed in the contents of IU’s election platforms that 
reflected some of its differentiated ideological profile. They combined 
classical left-wing issues, as the defence of workers’ rights, with other 
topics related to the New Politics (Ramiro, 2000a). The IU has tried to 
adopt a red-green programme. The presence of environmental issues in 
the electoral programmes of the IU is especially relevant, and it is the party 
that gives more attention to these issues in its platform (Ramiro and 
Morales, 2002). It is also the party with closest relations with the 
environmental movement (Jiménez, 1999). The IU has also highlighted 
peace issues in its programmes and has pronounced itself against several 
war conflicts. 
The IU and the PCE sometimes showed a certain willingness to 
pact with the PSOE. However, this was only a campaign tool to avoid 
being accused of being sectarian and anti-socialist. The existence of 
several agreements and coalition governments at a local level, has been 
an exception to a general rejection to any agreement. The interesting point 
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is that the electoral growth of the IU did not moderate their political stances 
and views about the PSOE. On the contrary, in the mid-1990’s the IU and 
the PCE radicalised their approach towards the PSOE and its 
governments. After the European elections of 1994, the IU leaders even 
thought that the IU was close to winning the PSOE electorally. To reach 
that goal, the leadership thought that the IU should maintain a clearly 
differentiated identity and a strong opposition to the PSOE24. When in the 
1995 and 1996 elections the IU only obtained modest results, this did not 
lead to modify the strategy defined years before. The electoral messages 
of as late as in 1999, still included the usual definition of PSOE as a right-
wing party. It was only after the complete failure of the IU in the local, 
regional and European elections of 1999 that the leaderships of the IU and 
the PCE initiated an ambiguous change that included a global agreement 
with the PSOE to form left-wing local governments25. Therefore, the 
debate around the strategic appropriateness of the strong anti-soci list 
messages only emerged once the IU lost in virtually all the electoral 
districts in 1999. Finally, a few months before the 2000 general elections, 
the IU signed an agreement with its previous “enemy”, the PSOE. It was 
really a colossal change in its traditional strategy, and it was reached at 
with little debate and discussion within the governing bodies and with only 
a minor internal opposition. The agreement included a short list of common 
policies, the commitment to form a coalition government and a pact for the 
elections to the Senate. This important change was motivated by the fear 
within the IU of suffering a new and more intense electoral defeat in the 
2000 general elections. 
Therefore, the PCE and the IU did not only maintain this general 
strategy of conflict with the PSOE for political reasons. Certainly, they 
thought that the radical defence of their autonomy and identity against any 
collaboration with the PSOE meant the defence of a correct political 
platform. But it was not only a policy-seeking strategy. They also thought 
that this strategy was the most beneficial in electoral terms, that it was 
going to lead the IU to become the first Spanish left-wing organisation over 
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and above the PSOE, and that it would have a great electoral boost. In this 
sense, the leaders of the PCE and the IU did not perceive the existence of 
any trade-off between the vote and policy-seeking strategies, which they 
thought to be coincident. Moreover, the electoral results of 1995 and 1996, 
which were far from their original expectations of “sorpasso”, did not lead 
to any change in their strategic line. It was only after the 1999 election 
disaster that the leaders clearly saw that their political strategy was 
damaging from an electoral point of view, and that it threatened IU’s 
survival. Only in such a dramatic circumstance did the PCE modify its 
political line to avoid more vote losses. 
The Strategy Towards the CC.OO. 
The CC.OO. trade union is the union to which the majority of the 
IU and the PCE members belong. However, the proportion f communist 
members within CC.OO. is small. In fact, this proportion has been 
decreasing in the last years and is very reduced compared to that of the 
democratic transition years. Also, in comparison to those years, the 
overlapping membership between the leaderships of the PCE and  the IU 
with the CC.OO. has reduced dramatically. During the 1980’s there was a 
certain personal link between the leaderships of the PCE and the CC.OO. 
due to the presence of several union leaders in communist governing 
bodies. The union leaders participated in several types of communist and 
IU activities and the PCE kept some degree of influence over the union. 
This party-union link began to disappear from 1991 and 1992 onwards. At 
this time, the position of the majority of the union leaders on the future of 
the party and the organisational model for the IU was different to that of 
the PCE leadership (the union leaders preferred the dissolution of the 
PCE). Today these personal links or the presence of union leaders in 
communist and IU governing bodies are almost insignificant26. 
The PCE still considers the CC.OO. union as the one its members 
should affiliate to. However, the traditional relationship of brotherhood 
between the PCE and the CC.OO. (and consequently between the IU and
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the CC.OO.) broke up completely in the 1990’s. While in the 1980’s there 
was a smooth exchange between both organisations, sharing short and 
mid-term goals, and supporting each other, the situation changed sharply 
in the 1990’s. Since 1994 the PCE modifie  its view on the Spanish unions’ 
strategies and especially, of the CC.OO. Since the mid-1990’s, the PCE 
constantly accused the CC.OO. of contributing to workers’ demobilization, 
of sharing the neo-liberal ideology, of a lack of response to the policies of 
the socialist government, and of having a non-democratic and bureaucratic 
way of operating. In this environment of conflict, the PCE stressed the 
need to organise the party in the workplace and to coordinate the action of 
communist activists inside the union. 
Therefore, in the mid-1990’s the previous model of solidarity and 
cooperation between the PCE and the CC.OO. that was based on the 
existence of mutual benefits, disintegrated. Since 1994, there was a 
significant divergence about immediate goals, a diagreement about the 
roles and spheres of action of each organisation and the previous 
development of common actions. The preferential relationship had 
absolutely weakened. In the elaboration of its strategy towards the 
CC.OO., there were several factors that affected the PCE and the IU 
leaderships’ choices. First of all, they perceived a decrease in union 
mobilisation. This was a key issue due to the idea, very rooted within the 
IU and the PCE, that the left could only grow electorally in situations of 
wide social mobilisation. This interpretation, at a time when there was a 
total conflict with PSOE and the IU was electorally growing, originated a 
very aggressive approach towards the unions and, especially, towards the 
former sister organisation, the CC.OO. In addition to this, the strategy of 
attacking union leaders could not have been developed in the absence of a 
favourable cultural milieu in the PCE and the IU. A very traditional view of 
the party-union relationship has survived in the PCE and among its 
leadership. This view, with a clear Leninist heritage, has also affected the 
interpretation of the recent evolution of Spanish unions, and has motivated 
the aggressive stances of the PCE and the IU. From this perspective, the 
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decrease in the industrial conflict (a trend that was real) and the growing 
distance that the unions and the leaders of the CC.OO. wanted to maintain 
with the parties, was seen as a political betrayal. A short-term conflict 
could be justified if it was going to produce changes in union tactics 
(workers’ mobilisation) and a better electoral performance for the IU. This 
struggle only disappeared, once more, after the electoral failure of 1999 
when the PCE and the IU began a more moderate strategy towards the 
CC.OO. After the electoral disaster of 2000 and the change of leadership 
in the IU at the end of that year, these peaceful attitudes towards the 
policies of the CC.OO. were reinforced. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The communist evolution and process of adaptation since the mid-
1980’s has resulted in a transformed party, with very low activity, that 
develops its political work mainly through another organisation controlled 
by the communists. This organisation, the IU, has an ambiguous model of 
operation. The IU is today a very developed organisation with deeply 
consolidated structures. However, the PCE continues to be present and the 
communists have the last say on the IU choices. The evolution of the PCE 
and the IU has been decisively influenced by external and internal factors. 
However, the importance of these factors that have affected the decision-
making processes has been changing. The circumstances around an 
election determined that the vote-seeking strategies were given priority at 
certain times. On the contrary, at other times, internal or organisation l 
needs pushed the strategies in other directions, thus paying less attention 
to vote-seeking aspects.  
The communist electoral crisis at the beginning of the 1980’s was 
the main incentive for the creation of the IU. And it was also the search for 
votes what gave an impulse to the development of the IU at the end of the 
1980’s. Other external factors, as the crisis of Communism since 1989 and 
the end of the Soviet Union, had a limited real effect. Although they 
originated some internal moves and debates, th ir influence was softened 
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by the previous changes in the PCE, the creation of the IU some years 
before, and its promising electoral evolution. The PCE showed a certain 
flexibility and transformed its organisation (losing activity while the political 
tasks were carried out through the IU) and its programme (launching the 
IU’s red-green discourse) according to what the leaders understood as 
electoral imperatives. However, the PCE and the IU behaviour and 
evolution were not only determined by electoral incentives. The leaders’ 
perception of the limits that the rank-and-file imposed upon further 
organisational developments (the disappearance of the PCE and the 
transformation of the IU into a party) constrained their choices. Finally, a 
shift of goals took place when the PCE’s own survival was placed as a 
priority goal. This important change in the communist strategy is, again, 
due to internal motives. The loyalty of the communist affiliates was 
persistent. But, very remarkably, the PCE was also an organisational tool 
that enabled maintaining the control over the IU. Without it, the control that 
the communist elites maintained on the IU could disappear.  
From a political point of view, the PCE and the IU are not the 
prototypical policy-seeking parties, as we could expect among the radical 
left. The PCE and the IU leaders thought that their intense confrontation 
with the PSOE was electorally beneficial. They sincerely thought that their 
differences and their powerful statements were the most competitive 
strategy. No doubt that this way of thinking is closer to the way in which 
Downs’ critics conceive the electoral competition than to the traditional 
Downsian arguments. When the PCE and IU perceived that there was a 
trade-off between their political discourse and the search for votes (after 
the electoral failure of 1999) they changed their strategy by moderating 
their political tactics. A similar process can be described about the conflict 
with the CC.OO. given their moderation after the electoral failure. 
Confronted with the electoral failure, and perceiving for the first time a 
trade-off between the policy-seeking and vote-seeking goals, the PCE and 
IU radically changed the principles that had given form to their entire 
strategy during the second half of the 1990’s. 
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The PCE and the IU are living at present the beginning of a new 
cycle that presents serious challenges. The electoral disasters of 1999 and 
2000 left the organisation with a very reduced presence in parliament and 
in great trouble from a financial point of view. The competition for left-wing 
voters is nowadays more difficult at a moment in which the socialists are in 
the opposition to the centre-right government. Some messages of the IU’s 
discourse may also be potentially adopted by their competitors. The 
organisation shows some signs of exhaustion. The PCE is going to find 
increasing difficulties to justify its own existence after more than 15 years 
working through the IU. At the same time, the organisational structure of 
the IU seems to have reached its limit of development. With only one party 
within it (the PCE) –which is gradually losing all its functions– new 
organisational changes could be just around the corner. 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1. A situation in which the party is faced with conflicts among its organisation l 
goals; situations in which the different party goals are impossible to achieve 
simultaneously. 
 
2. Only the formation of the Greek EAR during that same year could be 
considered similar. 
 
3. On organisational goals see Perrow (1961), Etzioni (1961), and Simon 
(1964). 
 
4. However, both authors admit that organisational and institutional factors can 
not exhaust the range of possible influences on party behaviour (Müller and 
Strom 1999: 24). For this reason they do also consider situational 
determinants, more difficult to study systematically, which can also affect 
party decisions. 
 
5. These two factors are taken into account in several classical works such as 
those of Duverger, Panebianco or Harmel and Janda. I do not study the 
influence of institutional elements because, although they have surely 
affected the PCE and the IU, they cannot be directly made responsible for the 
changing behaviour of both organisations, given that these institutions have 
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not basically changed in Spain since the beginning of the democratic 
transition. 
 
6. The comparative ideological position of members and leaders remains a 
topic to be researched. It is difficult to rule out the possible existence of 
differences in the ideological positions among party members and also 
among party members occupying different hierarchical strata. In addition to 
this, the internal ideological balance could change from one case to another 
and within the same party at different times. 
 
7. For a more detailed analysis, see Ramiro (2000b). 
 
8. The parties were the PCE, the pro-s viet communist PCPE, the IR (Izquierda 
Republicana, Republican Left), the FP (Federación Progresista, Progressive 
Federation), the left-socialist PASOC (Partido de Acción Socialista, Socialist 
Action Party) and two more parties with confused ideological principles (the 
Humanist Party and the Carlist Party). The relevance of the parties that 
joined the PCE in the formation of the IU will be well understood from the fact 
that, even if the PCE was in 1986 a party in crisis and extrem ly weakened, it 
was the strongest and most institutionalised party within the IU.  
 
9. The correlation index among the electoral results of the IU and the PCE in 
each one of the Spanish electoral districts in the elections of 1979 and 1996 
is 0.75. The elections which took place in 1979 and 1996 were those in which 
the PCE and the IU obtained their best results respectively. The IU got its 
best results ever in the 1994 European elections which led to a certain 
euphoria within the IU and to consider the “sorpasso” of PSOE as a possible 
scenario for the following general elections of 1996. 
 
10. 7.9% of the citizens that voted for PSOE in 1986 voted for the IU in 1989, but 
only 3.3% of the citizens that voted for the IU in 1986 voted for PSOE in 
1989. 
 
11. From 1.9 (1986) to 2.3 (1999) in the ten-poi ts left-right scale. For the voters 
of the IU the ideological moderation was from 2.1 to 2.6 (see Ramiro 2000a). 
 
12. Between 1986 and 1999, the distance in the ten-point left-right scale was 
between 0.4 and 0.3 points (see Ramiro 2000a). 
 
13. Informe al Comité Central, 11-5-1984. 
 
14. Informe al Comité Central, 6-3-1985. 
 
15. See, Informe al Comité Central, 23-6-1985. 
 
16. The debate on the policies that could strengthen the PCE was already very 
relevant within the party during 1984 and 1985.  
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17. See, for example, Mundo Obrero, n. 569, 1990, p. 11. 
 
18. See, F. Palero, “La nueva organización de la izquierda”, Enmienda minoritaria 
presentada al Comité Central, 27-7-1991; and J. Berga, “XIII Congreso del 
PCE: Un paso de convergencia”, Enmienda minoritaria presentada al Comité 
Central, 27-7-1991. 
 
19. XIII Congreso del PCE, Documentos aprobados, 1992. 
 
20. See, III Asamblea Federal de IU, 1992, and Estatutos de IU, 1992. 
 
21. See, for example, Informe al Comité Fedral, 9-4-1994, and XIV Congreso 
del PCE, 1995. 
 
22. See, Información . 21, 1998. 
 
23. See, for example, Manifiesto, IV Asamblea Federal de IU, 1994. 
 
24. Informe Balance, IV Asamblea Federal de IU, 1994. 
 
25. Approved at the Consejo Político Federal, 26-6-1999. 
 
26. The weight of the PCE and the IU members in the CC.OO. is low, although 
the great majority of the members of the PCE and the IU belongs to that 
union. 
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